by Andrew McGregor - Agosto de 2006
Rockets are not new weapons, nor are they strangers to Middle East warfare.
Size, range and destructive power are all factors in the development of
rocket-based strategies, the ultimate of which was the "Mutually Assured
Destruction" of the Cold War. The rockets used by Hezbollah in the ongoing
conflict with Israel are much smaller and are usually integrated elsewhere
within the tactics of the battlefield. Hezbollah is known for innovation,
however, and has developed new strategic uses for their unguided rockets,
employing them as political, economic and psychological weapons. As stated
by Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres on August 6, "Nobody
understands why they started to attack, what the purpose of the attack was
and why they are using so many rockets and missiles."
The chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee
described why Hezbollah has been able to keep the rockets flying despite
extreme military pressure from Israel: "Hezbollah separated its leadership
command-and-control systems from its field organization. It created a
network of tiny cells in each village that had no operational mission except
to wait for the moment when they should activate the Katyusha rocket
launchers hidden in local houses, using coordinates programmed long ago"
(San Francisco Chronicle, July 21).
The 122mm Katyusha (range: 20-25 kilometers) is the mainstay of Hezbollah's
rocket arsenal. "Katyusha" is somewhat of a generic term today, covering a
wide variety of small, unguided, solid-fuel rockets produced by a number of
countries, including Iran. The Katyushas all have a common origin in the
Soviet BM-8 and BM-13 truck-mounted rocket launchers that were used against
the German army in 1941. Fired in short-range volleys of as many as 48
rockets at a time, they had an immediate military and psychological impact
on German troops.
Hezbollah usually fires their version of the Katyusha one at a time from
improvised launching facilities. Some Katyusha-type multiple-rocket
launching systems were specifically designed to be dismantled into single
units for guerrilla use. In 2001, the first truck-mounted launching systems
were reported in Hezbollah's arsenal, making more effective volley-launches
possible. There are some recent instances of volley-firing, such as the
attacks on the Israeli town of Acre on August 3.
Once in the air, the cheaply-made Katyushas are remarkably difficult to
stop. A few years ago, Israel and the United States cooperated in a joint
project to develop a "Tactical High Energy Laser" (THEL) to bring down such
rockets by igniting the warhead in mid-air through the use of a high-energy
chemical laser. In tests the system successfully destroyed several Katyusha
rockets, but mobility difficulties and technical concerns related to the
chemical fuel led to a cut in funding for the project in 2004. Research is
underway on a more-portable version with an electrically powered laser, but
production of this costly system is still years away.
The unguided Katyusha is not intended to strike a specific target. Rather,
it is designed to be fired with 16 or more of its kind in a salvo that rains
destruction upon a certain area, preferably a troop concentration, massed
armor or fortified emplacements. By firing Katyusha-type rockets singly (often
into sparsely occupied parts of Israel) Hezbollah has forgone the tactical
use of this weapon for strategic purposes. Here Hezbollah signals its
mastery of media warfare; the media covers wars like a sporting event, with
the scorecard being the most important element in determining who is winning.
Besides the daily updates of the number of troops killed, the number of
civilians killed and the number of air-raids launched, the media also
dutifully records the daily tally of rockets fired. Despite causing
insignificant physical damage, each rocket arrives like a message of
defiance, a signal to the Arab world that Israel is not invincible.
Hezbollah routinely looks for new uses for existing weapons in its arsenal,
and in this case they have transformed a battlefield weapon into a means of
political warfare.
Bringing Tel Aviv in Range
The introduction of longer-range Iranian-made Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets (also
known as the Ra'ad, or by the Hezbollah name "Khaibar") has given the
conflict a new dimension, with Hezbollah no longer restricted to hitting the
thinly populated Israeli north. The 240mm Fajr-3 has a range of 45
kilometers and carries a 45 kilogram warhead, while the 333mm Fajr-5 has a
range of 70-75 kilometers and carries a 90 kilogram warhead. Both systems
are usually truck-mounted. The Fajr-5 was first used in the July 28 attack
on the Israeli town of Afula, then again in an attack on the West Bank town
of Jenin on August 3. At the extreme limits of their range, the Fajr-type
rockets are accurate only to within a one kilometer radius.
An Iranian official recently confirmed that Zelzal-2 rockets, with a stated
range of 200 kilometers (although this figure may be significantly
exaggerated), had been provided to Hezbollah by Iran for use "in defense of
Lebanon" (Haaretz, August 5). The 610mm Zelzal-2 is a 3,500 kilogram rocket
with a 600 kilogram high-explosive warhead, first delivered to Revolutionary
Guard units in Lebanon in 2002. Israeli intelligence believes the missile is
capable of reaching the northern suburbs of Tel Aviv. Although the rocket is
unguided and difficult to use, the threat from the Zelzal-2 is taken
seriously, with U.S.-made Patriot anti-missile systems deploying near
Netanya to guard Tel Aviv. The Patriot system is useful only against larger,
longer-range rockets, with no effectiveness against the smaller Katyusha
types.
On August 3, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah made a televised offer
to Israel to stop firing Hezbollah rockets in exchange for an end to Israeli
air strikes in Lebanon. The Shiite leader warned, however, that Hezbollah
would fire its rockets at Tel Aviv if the Israeli Air Force attacked Beirut
(al-Manar TV, August 3). It is possible that Hezbollah requires Iran's
permission to attack Tel Aviv. The largest weapons in Hezbollah's missile
arsenal are likely to be at least partially manned by members of Iran's
Revolutionary Guards.
Grapes of Wrath Revisited
The current Israeli operation bears a great similarity to Israel's 1996
"Grapes of Wrath" operation: a massive military response to Hezbollah's
launching of Katyusha rockets into northern Israel despite the occupation of
the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Proclamations that it was
time to end the "Katyusha menace" came to nothing as the offensive had
little effect on Hezbollah's rocket capabilities and took few Hezbollah
lives at a great cost to Lebanese civilians. Hezbollah rocket launches were
carefully tallied by the Lebanese public as a measure of the movement's
success on the battlefield. The Shiite movement was strengthened politically
through armed resistance to Israel, while the Israeli government of Shimon
Peres lost the next election.
Following the 2000 evacuation of the south Lebanese security zone, Israel
refrained from responding directly to Hezbollah provocations along the
border in mid-2001 and spring 2002. The Israeli government was aware that
targeting Hezbollah would bring a flurry of rockets across the border,
followed by an inevitable escalation and probable re-occupation of a region
that Israel had just evacuated. For a time, at least, renewed war in south
Lebanon carried too high a political price.
Conclusion
Hezbollah's rocket strategy has successfully disrupted all activities in
northern Israel, forcing 300,000 Israelis into shelters or refugee camps,
and impressing upon Israelis that building a wall around their country is
not enough to ensure permanent security. Israel's war is incredibly
expensive, and the deployment of the reserves creates an economic drain that
is difficult for a small state like Israel to sustain. As long as Hezbollah
can continue to send rockets across the border, it strikes an economic blow
on its enemy. Continuing to fire the rockets also goads Israeli ground
forces into military confrontation with the guerrillas on ground that
Hezbollah has prepared for six years.
The size of Israel's proposed security barrier keeps changing with the
realization that even an occupation up to the Litani River (a zone 28-35
kilometers deep) will keep only Hezbollah's short-range Katyushas from
reaching Israel. A measure of this reality (and the importance of the "scorecard")
was reflected in the August 1 televised remarks of Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert: "I believe one can say today…that there is no way to measure
this war according to the number or range of the rockets being fired at us.
From the very first day, neither I, nor the defense minister, nor the
Israeli government, nor the military leadership—and this is to its credit—ever
promised for even one moment that when the fighting ended, there would be
absolutely no rockets within firing range of the State of Israel. No one can
make such a promise" (Israel TV Channel 1, August 6).
The resistance of Hezbollah fighters, the severity of the Israeli bombing
campaign and the inability of Israel to halt the rockets has resulted in
unusually broad popular support for Hezbollah both in Lebanon and a
politically frustrated Arab world. When ceasefire negotiations begin, it
will now be difficult for the Arab regimes that opposed Hezbollah at the
beginning of the conflict (particularly Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) to
ignore Hezbollah's calls for at least diplomatic support from the Arab
states. In the meantime, Hezbollah's rocket campaign continues to destroy
little militarily while it accomplishes much politically, economically and
psychologically.
[ Portada ]