Los oscuros motivos de China (Beijing's dark designs)
February 12, 2007
James Holmes (*) - The Washington Times
Hace tiempo que no subo ningún artículo en inglés a esta página. La mayoría
de los temas importantes tienen cobertura en nuestro idioma, aunque el
enfoque sea superficial y, a veces, algo provinciano. Los que quieren
profundizar en ellos y dominan el inglés cuentan con el magnífico
instrumento de la Red para buscar material. Pero cuando encontré esta nota
me pareció oportuno reproducirla. Aunque The Washington Times es un vocero
habitual de la derecha republicana, esta nota no tiene un contenido
político: es la visión de un miembro del establishment intelectual yanqui,
un oficial naval retirado y catedrático en temas militares que analiza
desapasionadamente las posibles razones detrás de la prueba china de un
cohete anti-satélites.
Los eventos del martes 27 de marzo han puesto la atención sobre la
importancia de China en la economía mundial. Pero nadie que quiera entender
nuestro mundo puede ignorar el rol del poder militar, detrás y apoyando al
poder económico.
El título del artículo es del autor. Si yo tuviera que ponerlo, me tentaría
con “Pensamientos sobre un conflicto que nadie quiere, todos temen y dos se
preparan”.
A sizable group of American commentators, concentrated in the arms-control
community, in effect blamed the Bush administration for China's anti-satellite
missile test last month. Critics depicted the test as an attempt to goad
Washington into negotiations towards a treaty banning the deployment of
weaponry in space. The administration has long resisted a ban, deeming it
premature and unnecessary. In arms-control proponents' view, Beijing flexed
its new capability using a ground-launched interceptor to bring down an old
Chinese weather satellite to show Washington how destructive an outer-space
arms race would be for this country: The United States relies on orbiting
satellites to sustain its economic and military primacy.
Ten days ago Beijing repeated its call for a space treaty. Call it an
exercise in coercive diplomacy.
Though plausible, the arms controllers' version of events is probably wrong.
Such an accord would lock in the United States' current superiority -- and,
as a corollary, Chinese inferiority -- in this critical domain. Influential
Chinese voices maintain that the United States is poised to develop space
weaponry, if indeed it hasn't already done so. They beseech China to keep
pace. In this vein, a senior colonel from China's Academy of Military
Science told the just-concluded Davos World Economic Forum that "Outer space
is going to be weaponized in our lifetime." One Chinese delegate at a
conference I took part in last summer proclaimed that the U.S. military had
already deployed fighter spacecraft.
Moreover, the anti-satellite test seemingly took the Chinese Foreign
Ministry by surprise. Ministry officials professed ignorance when first
confronted with evidence of the test. And it's doubtful they would endorse
an act that threatened to undo their carefully wrought "soft-power"
diplomacy, which portrays China as an intrinsically non-threatening nation.
So much for the notion of an orchestrated Chinese diplomatic campaign.
But what motivates China's military space program, if not arms control?
Taiwan is the most immediate priority. If Beijing opts for military action,
it must deter or defeat U.S. naval intervention in the Taiwan Strait. As
they gaze seaward and skyward, Chinese thinkers have embraced the concept of
the "assassin's mace," which envisions negating a superior enemy's
advantages through a single, sharp blow, the kind of blow that might be
struck by anti-satellite weapons. Its appraisal of the 1990-91 Gulf War
showed Beijing that space would represent an Achilles' heel for the U.S.
military should Americans come to depend on gee-whiz technology.
Space warfare represents the high-altitude counterpart to Chinese naval
strategy in the waters surrounding Taiwan, which leverages certain niche
capabilities, mines and stealthy submarines to deny superior U.S. Navy
forces access to these waters. Similarly, the ability to knock out U.S.
satellites would boost Beijing's chances of deterring or defeating U.S.
intervention in the Strait. Chinese warfighters believe and U.S. military
officials privately agree that satellites will be crucial to U.S. operations
in any cross-strait contingency. Detecting, tracking, and targeting enemy
assets are nearly unthinkable without sensors and communications assets
overhead. The pinpoint accuracy of precision arms such as Tomahawk cruise
missiles would be unattainable without Global Positioning System satellites.
But Taiwan isn't the only rationale for China's military space program.
Chinese strategists have begun looking beyond a Taiwan contingency, and what
they see spurs them on to even greater exertions in space. Beijing regards
the seas and skies adjacent to China's coasts as a "commons" through which
commerce, shipments of raw materials and military power can flow freely. A
rising China is increasingly reluctant to entrust the security of this
international commons to America's uncertain goodwill. Top leaders' desire
for some control over nearby seas and skies, including space, the high
frontier of the commons, is driving Chinese military strategy.
Look no further than Beijing's 2004 Defense White Paper, which ordered the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) to acquire the wherewithal to "command" the
commons, or its just-published 2006 Defense White Paper, which dropped
China's traditional plea for the advanced world to forego space warfare. A
Sino-American space race is not in the offing yet. But Beijing's endeavors
in space are a product of stark realpolitik, and they engage vital national
interests. As the PLA enters the high frontier, a cycle of Chinese challenge
and American response could come to dominate the bilateral relationship.
Stopping this cycle before it starts should be of utmost concern to both
governments.
In the meantime, the United States and other spacefaring powers will begin
to hedge, hardening new satellites against Chinese weaponry while
stockpiling spares. In short, they will hope for the best while preparing
for the worst.
(*)James Holmes is a former naval officer and a senior research associate at
the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security.
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